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The right to privacy covers a multitude of sins, not the least of which are
sexual. Because sex is private, so the reasoning goes, the state has no business
involving itself in sexual matters. Polis and eros have nothing to do with each
other. Of course, the political decision to distribute condoms in high schools
contradicts such reasoning. Nevertheless, the politicians who legislate in favor of
contraception and, even worse, abortion, continue to deny the interest of the state
in the sexual lives of its citizens. But the spread of AIDS has changed that,
exposing as a political dodge the specious appeal to the right to privacy when the
common good of the polis is undermined by the sexual activities of some of its
citizens. This paper advances the position that the common good and the state's
interest are best served not by legislation, thus far ill-conceived, but by education
in virtue, specifically chastity.
That the state has an interest in virtue must in today's society sound like a
ludicrous idea. Yet it is as ancient as Plato's Republic and Aristotle's Politics. In
fact, both Plato and Aristotle regarded the study of virtue as a branch of political
science. They reasoned that since man existed only in society, that is, in the (city-)
state, the state and the individual, therefore, had the same end, namely, to attain
the good life. l Thus, for example,justice should inform not only the operations of
the state but also the actions of its citizens. The case, of course, was the same for
the other three virtues discussed in the Republic: prudence (actually "wisdom"),
fortitude and temperance. If either the state or its citizens was party to moral
corruption, the good life was imperilled. It is understandable, then, that "Plato
was not a man to accept the notion that there is one morality for the individual
and another for the state."2
While such notions as "virtue", "the good life", man's proper "end" are not
foreign to us, the original context for understanding them largely escapes the
contemporary mind. Herein lies its difficulty for accepting the ancients' refusal to
dichotomize morality into a public sphere and a private sphere. The difficulty is
further compounded by the fact that in the development of western thought the
study of virtue lost its moorings in political science and, by the time ofImmanuel
Kant, was consigned to the subjective and private realm where, of course,
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religion was banished. To this day, the modem mind cannot dissociate morality
and religion, with the result that in the public forum any mention of morality
raises the battle cry against "imposing one's religious beliefs on others." The
Cuomo-syndrome of being "personally against/politically for" abortion is
another indication of today's moral dichotomizing.

...

The Original Context

What was the original context that made virtue, the good life and man's end
intelligible, and made splitting morality into public and private spheres
inadmissible? Although they practiced piety towards the gods, the ancients were,
of course, devoid of revelation. Hence their only source for ascertaining man's
proper end, his true good and the virtue needed for its attainment was reason. For
the Greeks, man was by essence animal rationale, distinguished from aU other
beings by an ability to think and to choose. He exercised this ability in a world
which was harmonious and orderly because governed by principles intrinsic to
every being. In speaking of the principle which determined the behavior of any
creature of a certain kind, the Greeks used the term "nature." Empirically, the
nature of fire differed from that of a rock or a bird. Each behaved differently as,
indeed, did man whose nature, governed by the law of reason, accorded him
freedom of choice in his behavior. But here lies the rub. For the ancients, every
nature, even a nature characterized by knowledge and freedom, operated within
a teleological context. That is, every nature was bound by a built-in purpose or
goal.
The notion dates back to Socrates and became fundamental in the thoughtsystem of Plato and Aristotle. A thing was structured by its nature to operate
toward a specific end which Plato and Aristotle equated with its "good". Within
this teleology, the good was defined by Aristotle as "that at which all things
aim,"3the end or purpose wherein the thing's mode of acting came to term. Since
end and good were really one and the same, the proper and purposeful
functioning of a thing was simultaneously the realization of its good. We may
note too that in this scheme, good is not in the first instance something that lies
outside the thing but rather something intrinsic to its nature, specifically, its
actions. Naturally, in the case of man whose nature permitted him free choice in
his actions, the question was paramount as to what constituted his actions good
or what purposeful activity enabled him to realize his nature. It was within this
teleological framework that the issue of virtue arose.
As mentioned earlier, ethics was a branch of political science because the
ancients admitted no distinction between the end and good of the state and that of
the individual. In answer to the question concerning what was for the state and
the individual the supreme good or end to which all else was subordinated, Plato
and Aristotle both agreed, eudaimonia, that is, happiness.· Through ample
discussion they arrived at the content of that happiness: the life of virtue. Says
Aristotle, "Let us assume then that the best life, both for individuals and states, is
the life of virtue, when virtue has external goods enough for the performance of
good actions."s Thus, it was for the attainment of virtue that states acted, for
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example, in governing by laws and that individuals acted, for example, in
cultivating certain interior dispositions. Because of this common good or end,
Plato could propose that between the happiness of the just man and that of the
ideal state, there was a real analogy as there was between the justice or right order
informing the state and that informing the polity of the soul.6
Virtue Identified
While the good life was one of happiness and happiness was a life of virtue,
what exactly was virtue? Following in the footsteps of Socrates, Plato identified
virtue with knowledge. Although he admitted distinct virtues, such as the four
moral virtues which he mentions in the Republic, they found their unity in
knowiedge. Plato held to the belief that no man chooses de facto evil knowingly
but rather mistakes it for the good. Consistent with his teleological viewpoint,
Plato claims that all choices which a man makes are sub ratione bon~ by reason of
the good he perceives. Logically then, a man's moral failure and responsibility are
in function of his ignorance.
However limited Plato's view on virtue, the equation of virtue and knowledge
does assume, and indeed, require that virtue be taught. That project, of course, fell
to the state which found embodiment in Plato's famous "philosopher-king." Be
that as it may, it was Aristotle who made the project practical and brought it, so to
speak, within the grasp of the ordinary citizen. Owing to what one author called
his "analytical habit of mind," Aristotle de-etherealized the notions of good and
virtue and with "psychological delicacy" placed them within an ethics of will and
intention.7
For Aristotle, it is only partly true that happiness consists in a life of virtue. For
him the happiness which is the good or end of man must also admit knowledge
(wisdom) and pleasure. In this hierarchy of wisdom, virtue and pleasure, wisdom
pertains to man's highest faculty, viz., reason, virtue to the powers and appetites
of his soul, and pleasure, the attendant result of wisdom and virtue. Jacques
Maritain, taking his lead from Aristotle, says that man's happiness is as complex
as man himself and is thus made up "of matter and spirit, of sense and
intelligence, of animal conditioning and rational, even supra-rational freedom, all
of this crowned, and guided by wisdom and contemplation."8 In short, happiness
involves the total man, body and soul. Furthermore, the teleological framework
of Aristotle's thought required that man act toward the good in such a manner
that his choices be in accord with his rational nature. It is in reference to these
choices and their concomitant effect on man's soul that Aristotle defines virtue.
In his Nichomachean Ethics he says "the virtues are modes of choice or involve
choice ... [they are] states of character.''9 Aristotle calls them "excellences" that
perfect man in his choices and enable him to make them with ease. Virtue, to
quote Maritain again, is a "stable disposition which fortifies and perfects the
powers of the soul in respect to the right use of freedom."lo This "right use of
freedom" finds its explanation in Aristotle's notion of what today we call "the
happy median," that is, the notion that "virtue lies in the middle." To use
Aristotle's words, "Virtue, then, is a state of character concerned with choice,
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lying in a mean, i.e., the mean relative to US."II Aristotle conceives virtue as a mean
between the two extremes of excess and defect with regard to man's feelings and
actions. Thus, for example, courage is the mean relative to the feelings of
confidence which at the extreme of defect makes a man's character cowardly and
at the extreme of excess makes it rash and foolhardy. Liberality is the mean
between miserliness and prodigality; wholesome pride between false humility and
puffed-up vanity; pleasant wit between boorishness and buffoonery: etc.
These myriad vices or extremes which affect man's character are hard to name,
says Aristotle. What is more, the median position which virtue assumes between
them cannot be determined with mathematical precision. Human feelings and
actions are far too complex for that. For this reason Aristotle defines virtue s.s the
mean "relative to us," that is, it is relative not to theoreticians, but to work-a-day
people who have acquired moral savvy through practical experience.
In any case, virtues are what the later medieval philosophers called good
"habits." They are qualities which inform the will, dispose its choices for the good
and thereby render the character of a man good. Habituated to choose the good, a
man so perfects his nature that he knows and chooses the good "co-naturally."
Knowledge and choice of the good are, as it were, "second nature." But to arrive at
this point requires some doing. After all, virtues are not in-born; they must be
acquired through education. Moreover, they must be excercised and practiced
until they become "a state of character." With his analytical habit of mind,
Aristotle distinguishes the man who merely performs just and temperate acts from
the man who performs them virtuously. In the latter case, the man acts from a state
of character; in the former, he does not. Thus, there is a distinction between acts
which create a good character and acts which flow from a good character already
created. Aristotle says, "it is by doingjust acts that the just man is produced, and by
doing temperate acts the temperate man; without doing these no one would have
even a prospect of becoming good."12
Before broaching the topic of chastity, we should mention about Aristotle that
having given examples of virtues as means between two extremes he gives distinct
coverage to each of the moral virtues. Temperance is the one relevant to our topic
because chastity is a species of temperance. Of temperance, Aristotle says that it is
the mean with regard to pleasure, the excess of which is self-indulgence and the
defect of which is no pleasure. Since pleasure naturally accompanies many human
activities, like eating or skiing or reading, the pursuit of a man to eliminate pleasure
must be one of the rarest of vices. Aristotle gropes to find a name for this type of
defect and makes do with "insensibility." Whatever the defect it seeks to remedy,
temperance deals largely with the excess of pleasures, most often of the physical
sort, by which a man indulges his appetites. 13
Finally, it bears mentioning that Aristotle, by way of transition to his book on
Politics, ends his Nichomachean Ethics by appealing to the state. With consumate
realism he says, "it is difficult to get from youth up a right training for virtue if one
has not been brought up under right laws; for to live temperately and hardily is not
pleasant to most people, especially when they are young." With this the case,
Aristotle cites the opinion that "legislators ought to stimulate men to virtue and
urge them forward by the motive of the noble ..." In the absence of such public
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concern, says Aristotle, "it would seem right for each man to help his children and
friends towards virtue ..."14
That injunction seems hardly to have been followed, if three centuries after its
writing St. Paul is to be believed. He says of the pagans that "Even the women
pervert the natural use of their sex by unnatural acts (para phusin). In the same
way the men give up natural sexual relations with women and bum with passion
for each other." IS Paul'sjudgment seems harsh but it characterized in the concrete
the failure of Greek wisdom to make men and women virtuous. Having at Athens
experienced first-hand the disdain of the Greek philosophers,16 Paul concluded
that "God in his wisdom made it impossible for people to know him by means of
their own wisdom." Realizing this, Paul thus proclaimed that "God has made
Christrto be our wisdom."17
The gospel and Greek philosophy have had in their encounter enormous
impact on each other. Leaving that subject to the specialists, however, we note in
passing that Christianity claimed as the source of its wisdom not mere human
reason but divine revelation. Essential to that revelation was the fact that Christ
redeemed man from slavery to sin and corruption and instituted an economy of
grace wherein man could attain virtue and live a new life. In characterizing this
new and virtuous life, the Second !ener of Peter uses words with a philosophical
ring that speak of man sharing in "the divine nature" (theias koinonoi phuseos).18
Were an ancient Greek to hear such words he would conclude that, in the
Christian, a new principle operated equipping him to act toward a divine good or
end which transcended earthly happiness. In short, without prejudice to man's
natural "telos" or end-in-life, grace empowered man to achieve one that was
supernatural.

St. Thomas and Chastity

It is in relating the order of nature and grace that St. Thomas Aquinas
manifests his great genius. He does so in the Summa theologiae by effecting a
remarkable synthesis between the Christian faith and Aristotle. While mingling
divine and human wisdom, Thomas does not diverge philosophically from
Aristotle in the matter of the cardinal virtues. We tum, at long last, to Thomas'
treatment of chastity.
In his Summa, Thomas, unlike his Greek mentor, gives specific treatment to
the virtue of chastity.19 While strictly speaking there exist only four cardinal
virtues, Thomas, like Aristotle, admits by extension sub-species of these. Thus,
under temperance, Thomas considers as virtues, abstinence, fasting, sobriety,
chastity and virginity. As an exercise oftemperance, each virtue is defined by the
sense-object which stirs man's sensual appetite. Hence, the virtues of abstinence,
fasting and sobriety regulate man's appetite for food and drink while chastity and
virginity regulate man's appetite for sex.
To say that the above virtues "regulate" man's appetite requires for the sake of
clarification a brief digression into the psychology which governed Thomas'
thinking. Like Aristotle, Thomas understood an appetite to be a thing's bent
toward a good, or, an inclination towards an end. Moreover, he acknowledged
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the effects of the sensory appetites when they responded to sense objects.
According to customary usage, Thomas called those effects, "passions," which
today we call "feelings." So primal an appetite like that for food or sex necessarily
stirred in man strong feelings like those of love, desire and pleasure. Of
themselves such feelings are irrational, products of man's animal nature and in
need of integration with man's spiritual nature. It is at this juncture of man's
animal and spiritual nature, that is, at the juncture of his feelings and his reason
that temperance comes into play. St. Thomas says "that it pertains to moral virtue
to safeguard the good of reason against the passions that conflict with reason."20 It
falls, therefore, to temperance to regulate man's appetite for pleasure; to chastity
to regulate his appetite specifically for sexual pleasure.
I
The virtue of chastity, therefore, introduces reason into the prm Ince of
sexuality. St. Thomas says that "chastity requires that a person moderate the use
of his corporeal members in accord with the judgment of reason and the choice of
the will."2) Were reason and choice barred from this realm, man would be
tyrannized by his sexual appetites and enslaved by his passions. When speaking
of reason in the sexual realm, Thomas does not have in mind some persuasive
logic or argumentation that compels a man, as it were, from the outside, to
restrain his sexual behavior. Ratio for Thomas is something that has an intrinsic
reference to reality so that to be in accord with reason means to be right "in itself."
"The order of reason accordingly signifies that something is disposed in
accordance with the truth of real things."22 Thus, by introducing "ratio" into the
sexual sphere, chastity disposes a man so that in exercising his sexual appetites he
acts "in accordance with the truth of real things".
Understanding this last phrase is of the utmost importance. To be "in
accordance with the truth of real things" means to respect their natures. We have
already defined nature as that principle by which a thing behaves so as to achieve
its good or end. This teleology provides man not only the basis for objective
science whereby he discovers purposeful behavior in nature but also an objective
standard for gauging whether or not his behavior corresponds to the truth of real
things. This idea of discerning in created things their inner "ratio" and of man's
need to act in accord with it was refined by Thomas and later called the "theory of
naturallaw."23 The term ought not to distract us. We need only add that with his
belief in God the Creator, Thomas viewed the world as governed by God's
"ratio" which becomes, as it were, the inner law determining creatures toward
their proper end. In short, God's reason and purpose for each creature is reflected
in its nature.
Be that as it may, we may ask relative to our topic on chastity, what is the
nature or inner "ratio" of sexuality? What is its end or purpose? How is its good
achieved? It is only by answering these questions that we can appreciate how
chastity disposes a man vis-a-vis his sexual appetites to act "in accordance with
the truth of real things."
Neither Greek nor Christian wisdom ever denied that sex by nature was
procreative, that it achieved its end or good in the physical generation oflife. Seen
solely in these terms, however, the exercise of sex between humans and that
between animals is indistinguishable. But sex that is a human act demands
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something more. The nature of man requires a permanent and stable relationship
between male and female if the good of human sexuality is to be properly and
fully realized. Thus, while sex is by nature procreative, its human realization
requires the stability of marriage for the proper rearing and nurturing of children.
Western tradition has, therefore, expressed the good or end of human sexuality
and marriage as proles and rules, that is, as offspring and fidelity. (Christianity
added a third term, sacramentum). 24
Another Dimension

.
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Yet, in contemporary culture we tend to view human sexual activity
exclusively in personal terms, that is, as the domain solely ofthe couple engaging
in it. But there is another dimension that has been consistently recognized since
the inception of western philosophy. St. Thomas expresses it very clearly: "the
exercise of sex is of the utmost importance for the common good because it is [for]
the preservation ofthe human race."2S That is, in their procreative activity, male
and female assure the continuance of the human race. In their persons they
represent human nature: "each is one half in that nature and seeks the other half
to complete a whole ... it is from the level of that nature that the appropriate
desires well up, so strong and demanded for survival as to call for a special virtue
to temper them according to reason."26 Chastity is, of course, that virtue
regulating man's sexual appetite in accordance with the good end of sex, namely,
"proles" and "fides."
In grasping the "ratio" or true nature of sex, man, therefore, has an objective
standard by which to gauge whether or not his activity is "in accordance with the
truth of real things." The moral man lives in such accord while the immoral man
does not. Well-known and perennial are the failures of the immoral man in
regard to the "proles" and "fides" of sexuality: contraception, abortion, adultery,
fornication, homosexuality. In such assaults on the nature of sexuality, the order
of reason is transgresSed.
Yet, ironically, in the one who violates the nature of sexuality, the moral failure
may not be against the virtue of chastity. Why? Because the virtue may not yet be
present as a "state of character," as an "excellence" or ease in choosing the good,
as "a stable disposition" perfecting the soul's powers. Rather, the failure, while
grave, may be at a more superficial level and for this reason deserving another
name: "incontinence." To fail in continency - today we call it "abstinence" - is
not to fail in chastity. For the latter is a deep-rooted basic attitude, a secondnature, a virtue, while the former is an exercise in self-control, a first step or series
of steps toward virtue, a rough sketch of what yet has to emerge.27 Continency
leads to chastity as repeated good acts lead to virtue. To fail in continency is
infirmitas,' to fail in chasisty, malitia. Whether through weakness or wickedness,
failure in the realm of sexuality is no trivial matter. For given the nature ofsexuality, unchastity or incontinency affects both the character of the individual
and the common good.
With this last comment we come full circle as we return to our opening
remarks both about the decision of the state to distribute condoms and about
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the predicament facing society with the spread of AIDS. For who could deny
that, concerning the matters of condoms and of AIDS, both the character of
individuals, specifically our youth, and the common good are at stake? Indeed, at
risk! In both cases the state can claim no moral neutrality, either in fact or in
principle. As to fact, the decision to make educational facilities conduits for
condoms makes the state complicit in the inconstinency of those youths using
them. As to principle, the spread of AIDS in society threatens the common good
which the state is morally obligated to protect. In light of what we have said in
this paper about the mutual good of the individual and the state, about the nature
of happiness, of virtue, of sexuality and of chastity, there is an inherent and tragic
contradiction in the legislative decision to distribute condoms to prevent AIDS.
For with the aim of safeguarding the good of society, the state has become party
to corrupting the good of its citizens.
As we have seen in classical political thought, to set the good of the state at
odds with that of man as such is to imperil the good life for both. After all, in
terms of teleology, man and the state have the same end, which is happiness.
Furthermore, that happiness is dependent upon man's ability to integrate his
rational and animal natures, that is, his reason and his appetites and passions. In
this integration, the acquisition of virtue is so paramount that the ancients saw it
as a function of the state to promote it.
If today the state cannot or will not promote virtue, at least it should not
undermine it. Yet that is precisely what the state is doing where man's need for
virtue is most poignantly felt, namely, at the level of his sexual appetites. In
contemporary society, those appetites have gone terribly awry, leading an
editorial in The Wall Street Journal to ask, "Is it any wonder that the HIV virus is
spreading among teen-agers? In Washington, D.C., two-thirds of 10th-grade
boys and one-fifth of 10th-grade girls report that they have recently had four or
more sex partners .. .. Confronted with the grim shadow of AIDS, educators
can think only of distributing condoms and appealing for 'safe sex'."28 Under the
tutelage of a teacher or parent, no teen-ager handed a condom and/or instructed
in its use can take seriously the admonition for abstinence. As we know,
abstinence is not even virtue but rather an exercise in self-control which along the
road toward virtue is a first step. Promoting "safe sex" and condoms denies our
citizens even that first step.
The spread of AIDS has made the illicit use of sex a deadly game. For the
welfare of its citizens the state must educate not in sex but in virtue. The only safe
sex is that informed by the virtue of chastity.
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